Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos hacer una lectura de Tomás Carrasquilla desde el nacionalismo y el regionalismo, con el objetivo de identificar en su pensamiento las ideas sobre la identidad nacional. Nos basaremos en los ensayos de crítica literaria llamados “Homilías”, publicados por Carrasquilla en 1906 en la revista Alpha, en donde, a través de una crítica a la influencia del modernismo europeo en los escritores de su generación, el autor antioqueño expuso una defensa de los elementos autóctonos o regionales (...) en la confección de una literatura nacional. Dicho propósito lo alcanzaremos a través de dos momentos: el primero, desde la exposición del férreo rechazo al modernismo que profesó Carrasquilla y, el segundo, mediante la definición de los conceptos medio ambiente, región y alma nacional. Concluiremos que en la proclamación de un 20 de julio literario Carrasquilla expone los rasgos de un pensamiento que oscila entre el regionalismo y el nacionalismo. Para esta búsqueda de las bases de la identidad nacional en Carrasquilla, nos apoyaremos en las definiciones canónicas de nacionalismo e identidad nacional de autores como Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith, Claudio Lomnitz y Gilberto Freyre. Finalmente, en términos metodológicos, este trabajo se desarrollará como una investigación de tipo documental y de nivel interpretativo. (shrink)

Noticia y comentario sobre generatividad e historicismo a propósito de la reciente publicación del libro Mundo familiar y mundo ajeno. La fenomenología generativa tras Husserl de Anthony J. Steinbock, Salamanca, Sígueme, 2022, 429 pp.

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

This paper defends and develops an argument against epiphenomenalism, broadly construed. I argue first for a definition of epiphenomenalism which includes ‘non-reductive’ materialism as well as classical dualistic epiphenomenalism. I then present an argument that if epiphenomenalism were true it would be impossible to know about or even refer to our conscious states -- and therefore impossible even to formulate epiphenomenalism. David Chalmers has defended epiphenomenalism against such arguments; I consider this defence and attempt to show that it fails. I (...) conclude that an adequate account of mental causation requires us to abandon the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and attempt to rebut charges that it would be ‘unscientific’ to do so. (shrink)

The question of whether democracy is a human right or not has received increased attention in recent years from philosophers, and in the light of recent world events, from the general public. Tom Campbell provides a minimalist strategy to support the human rights status of democracy, one linked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent developments in International Law and global institutions. I suggest that we need to consider the question at a more philosophical level and argue that (...) Campbell’s minimalist strategy for understanding the right to democracy is inadequate to both the normative and symbolic claims associated with the idea. I develop my argument by considering two themes also engaged by Campbell: the demandingness of democracy, and the relationship between rights and interventions. (shrink)

¿Es posible servirse de los principios tomistas para conformar una nueva síntesis de los saberes acorde con los avances científicos de nuestro tiempo? Ésta es la pregunta a la que aquí se intenta responder de acuerdo con las líneas básicas del tomismo maritainiano. El artículo se divide en dos partes: en la primera se caracteriza una noción general de saber y en la segunda se estructuran y clasifican –también a título general– los saberes especulativos. Descubrimos así un marco apropiado para (...) recuperar la integridad del saber humano en una unidad orgánica y vital. (shrink)

Smart grids are designed to revolutionize the energy sector by creating a smarter, more efficient and reliable power supply network. The rise of smart grids is a response to the need for a more comprehensive and sophisticated energy system that caters to the needs of homes and businesses. Key features of smart grids include the integration of renewable energy sources, decentralized generation and advanced distribution networks. At the heart of smart grids is a sophisticated metering system, consisting of intelligent electronic (...) devices that measure energy consumption and enable two-way communication between the utility company and the consumer. The information exchanged via these devices is critical, as it includes sensitive data such as energy consumption patterns and billing information. With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0, the security of this information is of utmost importance. This paper delves into the security challenges faced by advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and highlights the crucial role played by cryptography in ensuring the secure exchange of sensitive information. Cryptographic protocols such as encryption, authentication and digital signatures are essential components of a secure smart grid infrastructure. These protocols work together to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the information exchanged between the utility company and the consumer. (shrink)

The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy offers interpretive perspectives on the historical roots of American philosophy and on present innovative developments in American thought, including studies of values, naturalism, social philosophy, cultural criticism, and applied ethics. A comprehensive examination of the life, art, politics, religion, and imagination of one of the most renowned philosophers of the twentieth century.

This collection of prize-winning essays addresses the controversial question of how meaning and goals can emerge in a physical world governed by mathematical laws. What are the prerequisites for a system to have goals? What makes a physical process into a signal? Does eliminating the homunculus solve the problem? The three first-prize winners, Larissa Albantakis, Carlo Rovelli and Jochen Szangolies tackle exactly these challenges, while many other aspects feature in the other award winning contributions. All contributions are accessible to non-specialists. (...) These seventeen stimulating and often entertaining essays are enhanced versions of the prize-winning entries to the FQXi essay competition in 2017.The Foundational Questions Institute, FQXi, catalyzes, supports, and disseminates research on questions at the foundations of physics and cosmology, particularly new frontiers and innovative ideas integral to a deep understanding of reality, but unlikely to be supported by conventional funding sources. (shrink)

Respecto del pasaje en cuestión (Verg. Ecl. 9. 44-55), la tradición manuscrita no se muestra uniforme: la mayor parte de los MSS asignan los vv. 46-50 a Meris; algunos pocos (M y γ) los asignan a Lícidas. El artículo aporta fundamentación en favor de la atribución de esos versos a Lícidas; repasa diversas soluciones adoptadas en ediciones y comentarios recientes, incluyendo la última edición crítica (Ottaviano, 2013), en la que se adopta (equivocadamente, a nuestro criterio) la enmienda nisi en el (...) v. 45. A continuación, las cuatro evocaciones de canto realizadas por Lícidas y Meris son analizadas en el marco de dos oportunos señalamientos de Schmidt (1972): a. el particular concepto de ‘autoría’ que rige en la ficción de oralidad propia de la poesía bucólica; b. la relación que se establece en la égloga entre el contenido de esas evocaciones y las categorías de poeta y uates declaradas en los vv. 32-36. (shrink)

Archer recognizes that sexual selection theory is sensitive to the effects of ecologies on sex differences, yet he does not explain the impact of such variation. For example, to what degree are there sex differences in aggression in polygynous and monogamous societies? I demonstrate how differences in mating perceptions affect the traditional dichotomy that males compete for and females choose mates.

This paper concerns various competing views on the nature of perceptual justification. Various thought experiments that motivate various views are discussed. Once reliabilism is rejected and some form of internalism is instead embraced, the following issue arises: must an internalist nevertheless require that perceptual justification involve the possession of evidence for the reliability of our perceptual processes? Matthias Steup answers in the affirmative, espousing what he calls internalist reliabilism. Some problems are raised for this form of internalism.

A crow sat in a tree holding in his beak a piece of meat that he had stolen. A fox which saw him determined to get the meat. It stood under the tree and began to tell the crow what a beautiful big bird he was. He ought to be king of all the birds, the fox said, and he undoubtedly would have been made king, if only he had a voice as well. The crow was so anxious to prove (...) that he had a voice, that he dropped the meat and croaked for all he was worth. Up ran the fox, snapped up the meat, and said to him: ‘If you added brains to all your other qualifications you would make an ideal king.’. (shrink)

Henri Bergson's work is often presented as an optimistic philosophy. This essay presents a counter-narrative to that reading by looking to the place of the problem of evil within his integral metaphysics. For, if Bergson’s philosophy is simply optimistic, or simply derives meaning from the wholeness of experience, then it risks a theodical structure which undercuts its ability to speak to contemporary social and political problems of suffering. A theodical structure is one that, at bottom, justifies the experience of suffering (...) by way of a concept of the whole or some concept that functions to subsume everything within it. Suffering is subsumed and given meaning by placing it within a relation, often with a telos that redeems or sublimates the experience of suffering. This takes such a singular experience such as suffering and renders it merely relative to the part it plays within the system of everything. On my reading, Bergson’s philosophy contains a supplement of what we might call pessimism or negativity inherent in his metaphysics as integral experience. This supplement undermines the theodical structure that may be assumed to undercut Bergson’s philosophy when confronted with evil or suffering and is seen most clearly in his critique of the notion of “everything.”. (shrink)